Olof Nelson Construction Company, Vincent-Peterson Construction Company, Groneman & Company, Young & Smith Construction Company, Utah Construction Company v. The Industrial Commission of Utah et al : Brief of Utah State Federation of Labor in Support of Appellees by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Olof Nelson Construction Company, Vincent-
Peterson Construction Company, Groneman &
Company, Young & Smith Construction Company,
Utah Construction Company v. The Industrial
Commission of Utah et al : Brief of Utah State
Federation of Labor in Support of Appellees
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinne
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Olof Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 7633 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1400
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLOF NELSON CONSTRVCTION 
COMPANY, VINCENT- PETER-
S 0 N CONSTRUCTION CO:M-
PANY, GRONE~IA.N & C0~1-
PANY, YOUNG & S~IITH CON-
STRt:"CTION COMPANY, UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION C0~1P ANY, 
Petitioners and Appellants, 
vs. 
THE INDPSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and THE BOARD OF 
REVIEW, APPEALS REFEREE 
and CLAI~IS SUPERVISOR of 
its DEPARTMENT OF E~1PLOY­
~IENT SECURITY, and JOSEPH 
B. ALLMAN ET AL., 
Respondents and Appellees. 
Case No. 
7633 
BRIEF OF UTAH STATE FEDERATION OF 
LABOR IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES 
The Utah State Federation of Labor appear here 
as amicus curiae by permission of the Court. 
The Statement of Facts set out in Respondents 
Brief is adopted. 
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ARGUMENT 
At the outset we especially invite the court's atten-
tion to the following factors which we deem of impor-
tance. 
The claimants, for unemployn1ent compensation here-
in, at no time were employed by the Associated General 
Contractors, and bore no relationship to them as such. 
The Associated General Contractors were and are in no 
sense en1ployers in this n1atter. The claimants herein 
for unemployment compensation were at no time em-
loyed by or were working at a struck plant or job. The 
claimants at all of the time herein 1nentioned were ready, 
able and anxious to work at their jobs. There is no dis-
pute, that such claimants were the victims of the opposite 
of a strike, that is to say, they were deliberately and uni-
laterly locked out from their jobs by their employer, 
against their will and without their consent. The In-
dustrial Conrmission found that claimants did not foment 
a strike; that there was no strike at the job or the job-
establishment at which they worked. The precipitate of 
the philosophy of the Statute and the question here to be 
resolved rests almost entirely on the involuntary un-
employment status of these employes seeking relief from 
lost wages. 
The Petitioners freely admit, but in a sort of con-
fssion and avoidance manner, the simple and precise 
issue herein involved when they say on page 13 of their 
Brief: 
"In recent years the increased frequency of 
large scale industrial controversies has sharply 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accentuated the problmn of the applicability of 
disqualification provisions to elaimants whose un-
employnlent, while rP~ulting from a labor dispute 
or strike is wlwlly i 11 voluntary. Clai1nants in the 
instant ca~e received the benefit of the wage 
increa~e resulting fron1 their ~trike, their duly 
appointed respresentative:-; called the strike 
against the twe 1ne1nber~ of the bargaining unit, 
and for that reason their une1nployment was, per-
haps. not involuntary." (E1nphasis ours.) 
Petitioners may not rely on subsection (d) of 42-2a-5, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended, because that 
statute by explicit language and by express legislative 
intent deals exclusively with a strike or struck plant. It 
reads: 
''an individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(d) For any week it is found by the com-
mission that his employ1nent is due to a stoppage 
of work which exists because of a strike involving 
his grade, class or group of workers at the factory 
or establish1nent at which he is or was last em-
ployed." (En1phasis ours.) 
These claimants apparently had just the opposite 
intention of quitting their jobs voluntarily, and that 
obviously is the very reason why they so vigorously 
sought after their work and as a result of their evident 
intention to continue working at their jobs the employ-
ers arbitrarily and one-sidedly locked these claimants 
out. The economic coercion, the economic sanction and 
the economic squeeze was not on the part of the employ-
ees, hut on the part of their e1nployers. Hence, the 
n·a~on becomes very evident why the Petitioner argues 
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and relies upon subsection ( 1) of subsection (d) of 
42-2a-5, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, which 
reads as follows: 
"(1) If the con1mission upon investigation, 
shall find that a strike has been fomented by a 
worker of any employer, none of the workers of 
the grade, class, or group of workers of the 
individual who is found to be a party to such 
plan, or agreement to foment a strike, shall be 
eligible for benefits; * * *." (Emphasis ours) 
The language used in this section may be unhappy 
and the result of many compromises in legislative com-
mittees, but the intention is quite clear. The subsection 
is supposed to take care of what is sometimes known 
as the quickie, wildcat or unauthorized strike, where 
some individual in a plant starts agitating for better 
conditions or wages, and to achieve the results foments 
dissension and unrest among his fellow servants, so 
quite naturally, when a worker of "any employer" who 
is a fellow worker of the "individual" and is a party to 
such plan, foments a strike he is not eligible for unem-
ployment compensation; for the very simple and under-
lying reason, that such fellow servant of such fomenter 
of such strike does not occupy an involuntary status; 
under the provisions of the statute he is an integral part 
and parcel of the plan or agreement to foment the strike, 
hence, ineligible to benefits. It is quite plain, this last 
section of the statute, upon which Petitioners principally 
rely, bears little or no relationship to the issues here to 
be determined, respecting these claimants application 
for unemployment cmnpensation, and actually is of rela-
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tive uniinportance, because the faet i~, that there was no 
claimant fmnenting a strike, and there was no strike at 
the locked out job. There wa~ no fellow worker available 
that eould plan or agree or conspire to fmnent a strike 
unlest' he wanted to defeat hi~ own welfare. The best 
evidence of what the clailuants intended is from what 
they did-they tried to head off a strike in~tead of caus-
ing a strike by eagerly presenting the1nselves for work. 
Petitioners .say on page 1-l- of their Brief: 
'"The r nions in this case ordered a strike 
at only two construction finns hoping to be 
secure in the knowledge that such a course would 
as effectively induce a cmnplete work stoppage as 
would a strike against all1ne1nbers of the bargain-
ing unit and that state benefit payn1ent of all non-
striking n1en1bers would appreciably lessen the 
drain upon the union's treasury by requiring the 
union to finance only a s1nall scale strike. As a 
matter of fact the Unions knew and had been 
notified several times during negotiations that a 
strike against one would be considered a strike 
against all." 
Now assume we go one step further and add to this 
hypothesis, of the Petitioner, that the various Unions 
involved planned to raise then1selves up by their own 
boot straps through assessing all of the e1nployees who 
were left working at the non-struck plants, and to sup-
plement the benefits received by the striking e1nployees 
for unemployn1ent compensation. How, and in what 
manner, does that concept ehange the obvious intention 
of the Statute, which provides in substance, that a worker 
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is only ineligible for unernployu1ent cmnpensation when 
and if a work stoppage is a result of a strike at the 
establishn1ent at which he was last employed. Not a 
single one of these applicants for unemploy1nent com-
pensation was involved in a strike or working in or at 
or connected with a struck plant. rrhe theory that any 
individual union, here under consideration, caused a 
work stoppage or strike to be brought about at the Paul 
and Barker jobs, and nmy have or rnay not have intended 
to assess the rne1nbers of their respective unions, remain-
ing at work and thus to contribute supple1nentary bene-
fits to unernployment cmnpensation benefits to the 
strikers; and rnay have intended to demonstrate economic 
sanction to the ernployers; or may have intended to pick 
one en1ployer off at a ti1ne; or rnay have intended to 
divide the e1nployers; or 1nay have intended to soften the 
demand on their treasuries, adds nothing to a determina-
tion of this issue pursuant to this statute, for the reason 
that if some employer locks out his employees and such 
employee finds hi1nself out of a job as a result of an 
involuntary status on his part he is entitled per se to 
unemploy1nent con1pensation benefits under the statute. 
The action of the en1ployers in this matter wa~ 
wholly arbitrary, wholly one-sided and so far as the 
locked-out clain1ants are concerned, wholly uncalled for 
and a downright intention on the part of the employer 
to coerce the claimants into sulnnitting to wages and 
conditions fixed and arbitrarily dictated hy the employ-
ers. 
6 
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'Vhy are the employers here seeking to block and 
obstruct these locked-out clain1ant ~mployees fro1n re-
covering what the statute says they are entitled to. If 
they prevail, is it not obvious, that they serve notice 
here and now, that the next tilne the e1nployers have an 
occasion to lock out their e1nployees under sin1ilar econ-
omic circumstances such ernployees will be without un-
employment cmnpensation and will be softened up to 
come crawling back and glad to work, seeking the status 
quo. If these employers can defeat the statute by revers-
ing the process of striking first then they would indeed 
have a mighty econmnic weapon over their employees 
and this n1ay be precisely what they are maneuvering 
for. There is a slogan in n1ilitary affairs, that the best 
defense is a good offense, hence it is conceivable that 
in the future, if these unemployment compensation bene-
fits are unavailable under such unilateral technique we 
may be hearing more about lockouts than we do strikes. 
Assume that the Petitioners here were to win this 
case upon son1e circumloquitous theory or legerdemain 
doge, that these locked-out clai1nants were somehow 
eager and avid strikers and not involuntary lockouts, 
and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation 
under the wording of subsection (1) of subsection (d) 
of 42-2a-5, and in some strange and indirect manner 
connected in with son1e individual of the grade, class or 
group of workers who fomented a strike. The difficulty 
then to be encountered, under such hypothesis, is that 
no matter how 1nuch fomenting was thought or sur1nised 
to have been done, actually no strike ensued at the last 
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place of clailnants employment, .and still the further 
difficulty to be encountered is that the Industrial Com-
nlission has already found, as a matter of fact, that there 
was no strike at the last place of entployment of claim-
ants and that clain1ant~ unemployment status was in-
voluntary. 
IMPHAC'ri CAL ADniiNISrrRATION OF 
THE ACT 
What happens to the administration of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Act when the minds, motives, 
and intentions of the respective leaders of all these 
respective local unions are sought to be explored-a 
rather strange and wholly impracticable application 
devolves on the Industrial Commission, for in each case 
they would find themselves required to go far beyond 
the objective standards set up by the Act, in such plain 
language, and resort to a guessing and speculating 
procedure, respecting the subjective Inotives and explore 
the thinking of the construction trade union officers and 
others and otherwise in order to fix the eligibility status 
of each claimant. This would create quite a Donnybrook 
Fair, for the employer would always claim, under sub-
section (1) of subsection (d) of the Act that a worker 
on some job conspired with another worker and he with 
another to the end that an attributed intention is super-
iinposed on some imaginary strike action, and thus the 
apprehensive eutployer could claint an excuse to lock out 
his employees and contend, in the terms of subsection 
(1), that he is under strike status, and his employees 
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without benefit of unen1ploy1nent cmnpensation, a source 
of revenue under involuntary unmnployment statuH, 
available when it is nwst deHperately needed. There 
most alway~ ensues a turgid n1elange of effusions eman-
ating front partisan u1inds when representatives of labor 
and managetnen t gather around the bargaining table ; 
they huff, they puff and they bluff down to the last 
penny of money and last 1ninute of time, and sometimes 
they even tell their respective shareholders and mem-
bership how lucky they are to be so well represented-
but is all this planning, schen1ing and maneuvering, on 
the part of agents of industry and labor, the business 
of the Industrial Conunission in determining the merits 
of an unemoplyment compensation claim, where the 
worker took no part in a strike, but on the contrary pre-
sented himself for work-then finds himself locked out 
of his job, between vice and versae, bewildered and 
flabbergasted because his boss says he is on an non-
existent strike. The fact that the claimant under these 
facts is a union member has no more bearing on the case 
than if he were a Republican or Democrat-because 
neither the organization or the claimant participated 
in anywise whatsoever in a strike at the employer's job-
establishment; indeed the Industrial Comn1ission so 
found that there was no strike at claimants job-establish-
ment and his unemployn1ent status was involuntary, so 
how this Court can up-set such findings, predicated on 
~mch facts, is beyond our poor power to conceive. 
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ASSOCIArrED GEXERAL CONTHACTORS 
STATUS 
rrhe Associated General Contradors are not in the 
construction business, as such. It does not haYe an 
establishment, facton' or plant, and it has no grade, 
group or elass of en1ployees. It wa~ the Associated 
General Contractors who served a unilateral notice on 
all of the unions involved, that if a strilm against one 
contractor be declared, it \\·ould be deemed a strike 
against all. 
rt,here was a strike at the Paul and Barker job~, but 
the clairnants, here under consideration, had absolutely 
no connection with such jobs, directly or indirectly. 11heir 
sole ernployment was at the job where there wa~ no 
strike, but from "'hich they were respectively locked out. 
We are not here dealing with labor relations, as such, 
or with a- labor dispute, as such. vVe are here dealing 
with specifically one matter, to-wit: l;nemployment 
Compensation. The Court may search the contract be-
tween the respective unions and the contractors and no 
where will appear one scintilla that a union or the unions 
collectively, must strike all or none of the contractors, 
and no where will one scintilla appear that the Asso-
ciated General Contractors, the non-en1ployers here, 
agree or are required to shut down all construction joh:-; 
when only one job is struck. This all or none busine1-i:-; 
is an after thought; an arbitrary one-sided device of the 
contractors to defeat the Unemployment Compensation 
Act, and whip these claimants into submission. The 
As~ociatecl General Contradors eannot unilatPrnlly eon-
10 
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vert a ~trike on one joh into a general lockout to defeat 
the Une1nployu1ent Cmupensation Act, any nwre than 
they can conyert a ~ow~ l'ar into a ~ilk purse. Ad1nittedl~,, 
the As8ociated General Contraetor~ bargained for all of 
the~e contractors-but what of it-what right does that 
gin:• them to ~tep over into foreign territory, not under 
the Xational Labor Relation~ .\et or the Utah Labor 
l\elations ~\d, but into the field of the Unernployn1ent 
Compensation Aet, and defeat the obvious purpose of 
thi:; ..Aet, by declaring arbitrarily, without negotiation 
with the unions and ~trongly against their \viii and 
wholly outside the collective bargaining contract, that 
a strike against one job will be considered, by one side, 
a strike against all, and following up this device, they 
throw out the baby with the bath, by locking out all em-
ployees. That sounds too umch like the Nevada Justice 
of the Peace, who held: "If the defendant didn't do this, 
mehby he done sun1pin' else, so into the cooler he goes, 
an~,"·a~· and besides the Sheriff's wife ain't got many 
Loarders lately." 
PUl1POSl£ OF STRII{:E BEARS NO 
RELATIONSHIP rro UNEJ\lPLOYMENT 
CO~lPENSATION 
Assume the work stoppage at the Paul and Barker 
.Jobs was unlawful and in plain controvention of the 
contract, and in opposition to the provisions of the N a-
tiona! Labor Relations Aet, etc., ete. The Industrial 
(jomJn iss ion would not he concerned with all of these 
t•xtruneou;...; mattt~r;...;: that is to say, whether a strike was 
11 
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legal or illegal at the Paul and Barker jobs makes no 
difference in the premises. All the Industrial Commis-
sion is concerned with, in the instant case, is whether 
these clain1ants were unemployed on an involuntary 
status in the absence of a strike, and that, it so happens, 
is just what the Industrial Comn1ission did find. 
STRIKE NOT CAUSE OF CLAIMANTS 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
The strike at the Paul and Barker jobs, is not the 
sole or proximate cause of the lockout. That could not 
possibly have happened because of the sequence of 
events. The direct, sole and proximate cause of the 
lockout was just the opposite of the reason for striking 
the Paul and Barker jobs. It would seem that what the 
employers were seeking to do, by way of the lockout, 
was to eventually establish the economic status quo. 
Assume that all of the garages in this state from St. 
George to Logan formed a state wide automotive garage 
association, and thereafter said to the Machinists Union, 
who have them all organized, if you strike the garage 
in Smithfield, with whom you are having a labor dis-
pute, we will close all other garages in the entire state. 
Now if by that device the garage employees at Kanosh, 
Kanab and Koosharem are locked out and such em-
ployees are forced, against their will, into an unemployed 
status-would this Court permit this garage association 
to substitute its interpretation and judgment for the 
interpretation and judgment of the Industrial Commis-
sion, as here the Associated General Contractors are at-
12 
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tempting to do. OhYiously it was the affinnativP, volun-
tary attion of the en1ployer~ whieh brought about these 
claimants applieation for unemployment eompensation; 
~ole employer eonduct over whieh the~e claimants had no 
control, but on the contrary exereised diligenee to for-
~tall, and head off; ~o the end result, it would seem, is 
that the As~oeiated General Contractors are attempting 
to take a pre1nimn frorn their own one sided in1position 
and at the smne ti1ne ··soak" their e1nployees a penalty 
for being a peaceful unwilling victi1nized easualt:·. 
N"O YOLUKTARY ~TOPP AGE OF 'VORl( BY 
CLAIMANTS 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that 
the employers closed down their jobs and laid off their 
workmen. See Appellants' Brief Page 7. This closing 
down by the e1nployers, in the construction industry, 
was in accord with a predetennined agree1nent between 
the various employers cmnprising the Associated General 
Contraetors. The clai1nants here had nothing to do with 
this closing dmvn of the jobs, and this is further shown 
by the fact that they presented then1selves at their re-
spective jobs ready and willing to go to work 
The strike at the Paul and Barker jobs did not cause 
the other employers to close down their jobs. The con-
struction industry i~ not an integrated production line 
husine~s, with all of the mnployers contributing their 
part to a finished product, or where the closing of one 
job would force the closing of another because of lack 
of supplies, parts or services. On the contrary, each 
13 
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of these employers were competitors, and had bid on the 
various jobs. The various contractors could have con-
tinued their operations indefinitely, and the strike at 
the Paul and Barker jobs would have had no effect what-
soever on their operations. 
The lockout of the employees by their employers was 
not because of the strike at the Paul and Barker Jobs, 
rather such action was affirmative action taken by the 
employers to defeat the effect of the strike action of the 
unions. These employers, by throwing other union mem-
bers out of work, obviously hopeing to destroy the effect 
of this strike and thus force the unions to tetreat from 
their demands. The Unions called a strike at two jobs, 
and the affirmative action of the employers closed 
down all other jobs, and these claimants became un-
employed. 
Assume that the strike against the Paul and Barker 
jobs was a strike against the entire bargaining unit, as 
contended by Appellant. Still this strike did not cause 
the other employers to close down their work. Even 
though the strike against the two employers may be 
,considered against the whole unit, the facts show that no 
picket lines were established at the remaining employers 
of the unit, and the employees of these non-struck em-
ployers did not refuse to work. Even though the em-
ployers rnay want to, and in fact did, consider the strike 
as being against the entire unit, the fact remains that 
there was no strike in progress at the factory or estab-
lishment of these employers, to disqualify these claim-
ants under subsection (d) of section 42-2a-5. 
14 
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The Appellant would apply subsection (1) of sub-
section (d) of section -!~-~a-5 to the facts present in this 
ea::;r. rrhe obviOUS llleaning of ~ubseetion (1) is that it 
i::; to be applied only to the employe('~ of one en1ployer. 
The applicable portion of this subsection is a~ follow~: 
.. ~ * * shall find that a strike has been fmnented by a 
worker of any e1nployer, * * *." The only eonclusion that 
can be reached from this language is the legislature only 
intended to cover the employees of that employer for 
whom the worker, "·ho fmnented the strike, worked, and 
not to con•r any workers at any other factory or estab-
li::;hment. The clai1nant~ here were working for enl-
ployers who had no connection with the en1ployers 
against whon1 the strike was called, except their asso-
ciation in the Associated General Contractors unit, and 
there was no strike at their employers job-establish-
ment. Had it not been for the action of the employers of 
these claimants, there would have been no unemploy-
ment for these claimants and thus no application for 
unemployment benefits. 
A LABOR DISP1J11 E IS l\fORE THAN A STRIKE 
\Ve are not, under the Utah Statute, dealing with 
the wide and broad subject of a trade or labor dispute, 
as set out in the statutes of other jurisdictions, for in-
stanee England and California; where a trade or labor 
dispute bars an e1nployee frmn unemployment eom-
pensation. Perhaps no one kno\vs, or at least no one 
has written a satisfaetory definition of a labor or trade 
dispute. Prohably because no one understands what 
15 
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the limitations of a labor dispute are. The facts of a 
labor dispute are legion and its area as broad and sweep-
ing as industrial economics. In industry a trade or 
labor dispute can and does 1nean 1nost anything, and 
if, as is frequently admitted, the most efficient worker 
is the one who is constantly agitating for better condi-
tions, there are thousands of labor disputes to every 
strike. In a country where 500 contracts are signed, that 
the public never hears about, to every strike, that gets 
the headlines; the strike is well understood by most 
everyone, both in and out of industry. Therefore to 
cmnpare out Utah Statute, that bars con1pensation "be-
cause of a strike * * * at the establishment at which he 
is or was last employed.", with another statute from 
another state which bars unemplopnent compensation 
because of a broad, sweeping, complex and far reaching 
labor dispute is overdoing analogy, over simplification 
and speeding the train of circumstances so fast it runs by 
the station. 
Suppose the Associated General Contractors had 
kept their lockout strategy secret and sprung it without 
notice, when the Paul and Barker jobs were picketed-
would there be any indubiety respecting the favorable 
applicability of our statute to these claimants-of course 
not-but the principal involved would be exactly the 
same. With or without notice of the lockout, the unions 
did not agree to it, the collective contract was silent re-
specting it and the motive, the strategy, and the conduct 
pursuant thereto on the part of the contractors were all 
arbitrary and one-sided in terms of the statute, re~pect-
16 
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ing a grade, class or group of workers at an independent 
establishment. There was no relationship between the 
balance of the jobs and the Paul and Barker jobs. Those 
jobs did not interfere one scintilla with the operation of 
the numerous other jobs of the contractors. So to con-
tend that these clahnants voluntarily and willingly left 
their work because the Paul and Barker jobs were 
picketed is untenable and does violence to words and 
deeds; for let us again invite the Courts attention to the 
words of our statute, "an individual shall be ineligible 
• • * for any week * * * that his unemployment is due 
• • * because of a strike * * • at the establishment at 
which he is or was last employed." Hence, there being no 
strike, picket, walkout or any concomitant of a strike at 
the claimants' establishment where they were last em-
ployed; obviously entitles them to unemployment conl-
pensation. 
Suppose these respective clahnants did not want the 
union to represent them and were opposed to labor 
unions, but were compelled into sub1nitting to being rep-
resented by the union because of a National Labor Rela-
tions Board authorization election, in which election 
these claiinants voted against the union ; and further 
suppose, the union that so represented these anti-union 
claimants, because they had no other choice, so long as 
claimants worked on a job where a National Labor Re-
lations Board authorization election has been held, called 
a strike at a plant which is represented by an associa-
tion which represents 1000 other similar plants; and 
thereafter such association said to the union, "you call 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
off this strike or we shall shut down every plant in the 
Association, where we find non-union men working," and 
suppose that the Association did just that. Would it not 
be ridiculous to say that the union, representing the 
non-union claimants, which called the strike at a single 
plant, which provoked the association into unilaterally 
closing all other plants, where non-union men worked 
and were thrown out of work, and were therefore not 
entitled to unemployment cornpensation because the 
union forsooth represented locked out non-union em-
ployees. This analogy may seem far fetched but the 
collective principal is exactly the same circumlocutory 
theory ,to which the Association clings in its hypothesis 
to connect these claimants with the Paul and Barker 
strike through their bargaining agent; and the principal 
would still be the same if 499 out of 1,000 voted against 
the union at a plant National Labor Relations Board 
authorization election, and the same 499 out of 1,000 
voted in exactly the same way against the union in a 
strike authorization election; just a sample of the dif-
ficulty encountered when one attempts to confuse the 
broad subject of collective bargaining in labor disputes 
with the rather simple and uncomplicated conduct known 
as strike action, as conteinplated by our legislature, in 
the Utah Unemployrnent Compensation Act. 
FINDINGS OF COl\fMISSION CONCLUSIVE 
The Industrial Com1nission has conducted hearings 
and nmde investigations in this case, and after these 
proceedings were completed, it entered its finding of fad 
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and conclusions of law herein. In these findings of fact 
it found that there was no strike at the factory or estab-
lislunent at which these clainmnts are or were last em-
ployed, and thus the claimants were not disqualified for 
compensation under the act. Section -t2-2a-10 (i) of the 
Utah Code .. Annotated 1943, provides that in any judi-
cial proceedings the findings of the cominission as to the 
facts, if supported by the evidence, shall be conclusive 
and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to 
questions of law. :Manifestly, sufficient evidence is pres-
ent herein to sustain the findings of the commission, that 
no strike existed at the factory or establishment of these 
claimants. This is determinative of the decision in this 
cause. Since the Cormnission has found evidence show-
ing that there was not a strike present, the Court should 
not, in our hmnble opinion, disturb this finding. 
All of which we respectfully submit. 
UTAH STATE FEDERATION OF LABOR 
CLARENCE ~L BECK 
REID W. NIELSON 
Attorneys for 
Utah State Federation of Labor 
As Amicus Curiae. 
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